We assess the security of a quantum key distribution protocol relying on the transmission of Gaussian-modulated coherent states and homodyne detection. This protocol is shown to be equivalent to an entanglement purification protocol using CSS codes followed by key extraction, and is thus secure against any eavesdropping strategy. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.93.170502 PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses quantum mechanics to provide two parties (Alice and Bob) with a secret key [1], which they can later use to encrypt confidential information. Unlike classical key distribution, QKD relies, at least in principle, on no computational assumption [1], but only draws its validity from the laws of quantum mechanics. The resources needed for QKD always comprise a source of nonorthogonal quantum states on Alice's side, a quantum channel conveying these states to Bob, a measuring apparatus on Bob's side, and a (public) authenticated classical channel between Alice and Bob. QKD protocols generally consist in two (intertwined) parts. The first part consists in probing the quantum channel to determine whether it is possible to securely transmit the key over it. The second part consists in the explicit distillation of the secret key. It is the use of nonorthogonal quantum states which allows one to reliably probe the quantum channel.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses quantum mechanics to provide two parties (Alice and Bob) with a secret key [1] , which they can later use to encrypt confidential information. Unlike classical key distribution, QKD relies, at least in principle, on no computational assumption [1] , but only draws its validity from the laws of quantum mechanics. The resources needed for QKD always comprise a source of nonorthogonal quantum states on Alice's side, a quantum channel conveying these states to Bob, a measuring apparatus on Bob's side, and a (public) authenticated classical channel between Alice and Bob. QKD protocols generally consist in two (intertwined) parts. The first part consists in probing the quantum channel to determine whether it is possible to securely transmit the key over it. The second part consists in the explicit distillation of the secret key. It is the use of nonorthogonal quantum states which allows one to reliably probe the quantum channel.
Most interest in QKD has been devoted to protocols involving (an approximation to) a single-photon source on Alice's side and a single-photon detector on Bob's side [1, 2] . However, protocols involving quantum continuous variables have lately been considered with an increasing interest [3] [4] [5] [6] . Of special importance are ''coherentstate'' protocols [7, 8] . The quantum source at Alice's side then randomly generates coherent states of a light mode with a Gaussian distribution, and Bob's measurements are homodyne measurements. These protocols seem to allow for facilitated implementations and higher secret-key generation rates than the protocols involving single-photon sources [8] .
In this Letter, we constructively prove that secure coherent-state protocols exist. Previous security analyses have been carried out, but they were restricted to individual Gaussian [7, 8] or finite-size non-Gaussian [9] eavesdropping strategies. We here want to address a more general setting and allow a potential eavesdropper (Eve) to probe the quantum channel between Alice and Bob in any manner she pleases. We want to establish the security of coherent-state protocols against arbitrary coherent attacks (see [10] and references therein). The importance of our result lies in that it shows that no nonclassical feature of light, such as squeezing, is necessary for continuous-variable QKD: coherent states, homodyne detection, and well-chosen communication procedures are sufficient for Alice and Bob to distill a secret key.
The basic ingredient that we shall use in the remaining is the argument used in [10] to prove the security of the BB84 protocol, when classical postprocessing derives from a Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) code. Let us start with a brief review of this argument. It is well known that quantum error-correcting codes provide a means to perform entanglement purification with one-way communication [11] . The situation where Alice and Bob share N noisy entangled qubit pairs is fully equivalent to a situation where Alice would have prepared N pairs, all in the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen (EPR) state
and would have kept half of each pair for herself while sending all other halves to Bob through some noisy quantum channel. The effect of this channel on the state can be modeled as if the state either remains unaltered or undergoes one of the three following ''errors'': bit-flip, ! , or phase-flip, ! ÿ , or both, ! ÿ , where j ÿ i 1 2 p j00i ÿ j11i and j i 1 2 p j01i j10i. In the latter situation, Alice and Bob could get pure EPR pairs upon Alice using a quantum error-correcting code (QECC) to protect the halves sent to Bob from the noise effected by the channel. Equivalently, in the former situation, Alice and Bob can get CN pairs in the state (1) (C 1) upon Alice and Bob measuring the syndromes (or error patterns) of some QECC, Alice communicating the values of her syndromes to Bob, and Bob performing error correction so as to align the values of his syndromes on those of Alice. Then, C is the rate of the used quantum code. Clearly, secure QKD can be achieved from entanglement purification: Alice and Bob can certainly extract a secret bit from the state (1) .
A (binary) CSS code is a 2 k -dimensional subspace of the Hilbert space of n qubits (k n) [12, 13] . Such a code belongs to the class of so-called stabilizer codes; i.e., they are defined as the eigenspace of a set of mutually commuting operators fO 1 ; . . . ; O A g, the stabilizer generators. VOLUME 93, NUMBER 17 2 f0; 1g n . Because of this feature, it is possible to prove that entanglement purification using a CSS code followed by key extraction is fully equivalent to a quantum cryptographic protocol using BB84 as a physical part, supplemented with suitable error correction and privacy amplification [10] . The postprocessing works as follows. Let the binary vectors K and K 0 denote, respectively, Alice's and Bob's raw key bits, and let C 2 C 1 denote two embedded n-bit classical linear codes, with parity check matrices, respectively, H 1 and H 2 [14] . Alice announces the syndrome H 1 K. Bob corrects K 0 to the nearest vector K 00 such that
With high probability, K 00 K. The key is then reduced to H 2 K (privacy amplification).
Entanglement purification is (asymptotically) achievable using a CSS code as long as the bit-flip probability e b and the phase-flip probability e p satisfy
where hx ÿlog 2 x x 1 ÿ x 1ÿx denotes the binary Shannon entropy [10] . Equivalently, the BB84 protocol allows Alice and Bob to distill a secret key using the above error correction and privacy amplification schemes if the error rates for two conjugate bases satisfy (2) . From QKD schemes based on entanglement purification for qubits, it is possible to derive a secure QKD scheme using squeezed states and homodyne detection, which is in spirit very close to the BB84 protocol [4] . Let us present this scheme in a slightly modified form. Letx andp denote two conjugate quadratures of a single mode of the electromagnetic field (x;p i). Alice creates (about) 4N quantum oscillators in a squeezed state as follows. She draws a 4N-bit string b to decide for each of the 4N oscillators whether it will be prepared in an (2), Alice and Bob further proceed with error correction and privacy amplification to distill a secret key out of the N remaining key elements exactly as in the BB84 protocol.
The bit error rate e b is bounded by the probability that, when Alice sends an x-squeezed state centered on the value x 0 , jsqx 0 i, and Bob performs anx homodyne measurement, Bob gets an outcome whose value differs from x 0 by a magnitude greater than p =2. The phaseerror rate, e p , can be bounded similarly. Therefore, even in the absence of eavesdropping, e b and e p will be nonzero due to finite squeezing. As a consequence, it can be proven that a minimum of 2.51 dB of squeezing is necessary for the protocol to work [4] .
We now want to convert the above squeezed-state protocol to a coherent-state protocol. For that, we first observe that three modifications can be brought to it without weakening its security. First [4] , the above protocol is equivalent to an asymmetric protocol where Alice decomposes her real values as x Sx Sx p when using the x quadrature, and p Sp Sp p = when using the p quadrature, where Sx [Sp] is an integer and is some positive real parameter. Such an asymmetric protocol allows Alice to squeeze unequally the x and p quadratures. The squeezing should only be such that Eq. (2) is obeyed. In particular, Alice can use coherent states when encoding in the x quadrature if, when encoding in the p quadrature, she uses states exhibiting at least 3.37 dB of squeezing. Our second modification concerns the method used by Alice for encoding. When she chooses to encode in the x quadrature, she draws the value of x from the probability distribution P pos x and prepares a coherent state centered on x; 0. However, the decision to prepare states centered on x; 0 relies on an arbitrary convention between Alice and Bob about the position of the x axis. Instead of sending a state centered on x; 0, Alice could as well send a state centered on x; p, where the value p, drawn from some probability distribution P 0 pos p, may in principle be publicly disclosed to allow Bob to displace the state back on the x axis. Of course, a similar remark applies when Alice encodes information using the p quadrature. As a third modification, we note that there is no loss of security if Alice and Bob decide that the key is encoded in the coherent states and never in the squeezed states. They can decide that about two-thirds of the time Alice will send coherent states to transmit the key and to estimate e b , while about a third of the time Alice will send p-squeezed states to estimate e p . (Note that this fact holds for BB84 as well: one can decide that the key is encoded only in the Z eigenstates, while the X eigenstates are sent only to determine the phase-error rate.) In summary, the following is a secure squeezed-state protocol.
( Now observe that, as far as the estimation of e p is concerned, since Bob performs individual measurements on his oscillators, the action of Eve is the same as if she were acting on each oscillator with individual maps i : ! i , i 1; . . . ; 2N N 0 , where i denotes the map obtained by restricting the whole map T R to the ith oscillator and replacing the ith state appearing in the tensor product R with . Next, let M denote a sufficiently large integer and suppose that Alice and Bob had a means to estimate the quantities j
would be as reliable an estimator for e p as the one Alice and Bob would have obtained if they had used the state S. Upon performing p-quadrature homodyne measurements, Bob can determine the NK quantities
where I k fi 1 k; . . . ; i M kg is some subset of f2N 1; . . . ; 2N N 0 g. Because of the random permutation , we can be statistically confident that, for M sufficiently large, the quantity F jk does not depend on the particular set I k . In particular, we can be confident that F jk tends to 1 M tr Pp j 2N1 k . . . tr Pp j 2NM k with arbitrarily high accuracy (taking M sufficiently large). To conclude our conversion from a squeezed-state protocol to a coherent-state protocol, it remains to prove only that the j 's can be inferred from the F jk , when the coherent states k are correctly chosen. First, in order to simplify notations in the subsequent discussion, we define an operator E j (which depends on the i 's) by
Thus we have F jk tr E j k and j tr E j j . Next, let j j j ih j j and let P n j n jni denote the expansion of j j i in photon-number basis. Since P n j j n j 2 1, we have 8 > 0; 9 N j such that 
That is, if the quantities hl njE j jli, 0 l L ÿ 1, are known with high accuracy, then the quantity hL njE j jLi can also be known, with accuracy Or 2 . Thus considering some sufficiently small value r 0 , the quantity h0 njE j j0i can be inferred. Then considering r 1 > r 0 , one determines h1 njE j j1i, . . . , considering r L > . . . > r 0 , one determines hL njE j jLi. Of course, taking increasing values of L, the errors will accumulate and the choice of r 0 ; . . . ; r L is a delicate problem. But since we always consider a situation where L is finite, it should be possible to choose the values of r 0 ; . . . ; r L so as to control the accumulated errors. It should be noted that the coherent states used to estimate e p must be drawn from ens , so that Eve has no information on whether a coherent state was used for the key or to estimate e p . This can, in principle, be achieved by combining several distributions such as those needed in the above estimation procedure, and averaging the resulting e p 's.
In summary, we have studied the security of Gaussianmodulated coherent-state protocols. We have shown how to extend the protocol of [4] to remove the need of squeezing for estimating the phase-error rate. This quantity can be estimated using coherent states modulated in two conjugate quadratures, homodyne measurements, and appropriate classical postprocessing. The equivalence between the derived coherent-state QKD protocol and an EPR purification with CSS codes assesses the security against any attack, going beyond individual Gaussian or finite-size non-Gaussian attacks [7] [8] [9] . An interesting question is the following: how robust is this coherentstate protocol in a practical situation such as an attenuation channel? Answering it amounts to estimating how e b and e p vary with loss and with the amount of (virtual) squeezing involved in the protocol. Duplicating the analysis carried in [4] , one finds that a key can be distilled if losses are below 0.4 dB. This value should not be considered as a security threshold though, because it is strongly related to the periodic encoding scheme used here and in [4] to assign a bit value to a real number. Methods to get more efficient coherent state protocols will be presented in a forthcoming paper [16] .
